

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 W

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O 302015Z AUG 75 ZFF-6

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN JERUSALEM

TO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTO 10214

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (FOR SECTION INFORMATION)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, BR

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMO: PROPOSED REPLY TO FM SILVEIRA

REF: A) TOSEC 100276 (NOTAL)

B) TOSEC 100274 REPEAT OF BRASILIA 7462

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO SILVEIRA
FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER:

2. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR ANTONIO: YOUR LETTER OF AUGUST 20
WAS SLIGHTLY DELAYED IN ITS TRANSMITTAL TO ME HERE
IN JERUSALEM. I SHARE YOUR FEELING THAT OUR EXCHANGES
ARE A SOURCE OF PERSONAL SATISFACTION, AND I AM ANSWERING
IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE, BEYOND THE PERSONAL DIMENSION, OUR
TWO COUNTRIES ARE TOO IMPORTANT TO THE EMERGING GLOBAL
ORDER, AND OUR FUTURES ARE TOO CLOSELY JOINED TO ALLOW
ANY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISINTERPRETATIONS TO
CLOUD OUR RELATIONS.

A FUNDAMENTAL THEME RUNNING THROUGH YOUR LETTER DEALS
WITH THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR POLICY OF DETENTE
WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND OUR POSTURE TOWARD THE
DEVELOPING WORLD. I THINK IT IMPORTANT, ANTONIO, THAT I
SEEK TO CLARIFY THE DISTINCTION I SEE BETWEEN THESE TWO
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CENTRAL ASPECTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

AS FOR DETENTE, THE UNITED STATES SHARES TWO THINGS WITH THE SOVIET UNION: THE POWER TO DESTROY THE WORLD AND THE TRAUMATIC MEMORY OF TWO WORLD WARS IN THIS CENTURY. NO GOVERNMENT CAN RESPONSIBLY DO LESS THAN TO TRY TO CHAIN THAT POWER AND LEARN FROM THAT PAST. THESE ISSUES MAY HAVE ORIGINATED IN THE OLD WORLD BUT THAT FACT MAKES THEM NO LESS IMPORTANT TO ALL OF US AND TO WORLD PEACE. MASSIVE MILITARY FORCES STILL CONFRONT EACH OTHER IN EUROPE.

THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE WAS INDEED AN EPILOGUE -- AN EPILOGUE TO WORLD WAR II. BUT IT WAS BY NO MEANS EASILY REACHED. IT WOULD BE DISINGENUOUS OF ME TO SUGGEST WE DID NOT HAVE TO ENGAGE IN EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE EFFORT TO HAMMER OUT AN OUTLINE FOR THE ACCORD. BUT THE CONFERENCE WAS THE CULMINATION OF THREE YEARS OF PAINSTAKING NEGOTIATIONS AMONG ALL THE STATES INVOLVED LEADING TOWARD A BETTER DEFINITION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. EACH COUNTRY, LARGE AND SMALL, HAD POINTS IT WISHED TO ADVANCE AND IMPORTANT INTERESTS IT HAD TO PROTECT. THESE HAD TO BE ACCOMMODATED OR THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO FINAL AGREEMENT. IT IS DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET THIS BROAD EFFORT AS AN EXERCISE IN CONDOMINIUM. CERTAINLY THE PARTICIPANTS DID NOT LOOK ON IT AS SUCH.

BUT DETENTE IS A LIMITED PROCESS WITH LIMITED ENDS. THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE AS YOU EMPHATICALLY POINT OUT DOES NOT REPRESENT THE FULL RANGE OF PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE WORLD TODAY. WHO COULD QUESTION THAT THIS OPEN COUNTRY WITH ITS VARIED POPULATION AND ITS MARKET FOR IDEAS AND PRODUCTS EXTENDING ACROSS THE WORLD COULD BE INSENSITIVE TO OR ISOLATED FROM THE DRAMATIC CHANGES UNDERWAY IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE.

THE GREAT IMPORTANCE I PLACE ON MY FORTHCOMING ADDRESS BEFORE THE UN SPECIAL SESSION DEMONSTRATES THE PROFOUND PREOCCUPATION OVER ECONOMIC PROBLEMS THAT WE SHARE WITH THE "EMERGING PROTAGONISTS" FROM THE THIRD WORLD.

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BUT I CANNOT, ANTONIO, IN ALL CANDOR AGREE THAT THERE IS IN ANY OF OUR POLICIES THAT HAVE EVOLVED TOWARD THE THIRD WORLD OVER THE PAST MONTHS A "NATURAL TENDENCY OF TWO LEADER NATIONS TO GOVERN THE WORLD JOINTLY." THE CRUCIAL DEBATE NOW BEFORE US IS OVER TRADE RELATIONS, COMMODITIES AND A RE-EXAMINATION OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS. YET, THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COMMUNIST NATIONS ARE NOT ONLY NOT INFLUENTIAL

ON US POLICIES IN THIS REGARD BUT THEY HAVE VIRTUALLY
OPTED OUT OF THE DEBATE. THE SOVIETS PLAYED NEITHER
AN INTERESTED NOR ACTIVE ROLE IN THE WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE,
THE WORLD POPULATION CONFERENCE, SIXTH SPECIAL SESSION
FO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY NOR THE PREPARATORY CONFERENCE
IN PARIS. IN THESE FORA WHERE NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES
HAVE BEEN EXAMINED SERIOUSLY WE HAVE PLAYED AN ACTIVE
AND CONCERNED ROLE. AN OBSESSION WITH EAST/WEST
RELATIONS IN NO WAY NOTIVATED THE ATTENTION AND
INITIATIVES WE BROUGHT TO THOSE MEETINGS.
HOW DO WE APPROACH THESE NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES?
THOUGH YOU COULD NOT SAY SO, I BELIEVE THAT BRAZIL SHOULD
BE ONE OF THE LEADING FORCES IN ANY SEARCH FOR A TRULY
GLOBAL ORDER. BRAZIL'S OWN IMPORTANCE AND OUR SHARED
UNDERSTANDING THAT MUTUAL RECRIMINATION WILL NOT
AID THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT REQUIRED FOR A SUCCESSFUL
OUTCOME MAKE THIS INEVITABLE. I WAS HEARTENED BY YOUR
REFERENCES TO THIS POINT IN YOUR SAO PAULO SPEECH
AND I LOOK FORWARD WITH GREAT INTEREST TO YOUR ADDRESS
IN NEW YORK.

NOW TO CUBA. SOME COUNTRIES MAY HAVE ACTED AT
SAN JOSE IN THE MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT DETENT REQUIRES
NORMALIZATION WITH CUBA. WE DID NOT. NEITHER DETENTE,

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN JERUSALEM
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTO 10214

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NOR OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, NOR ANY DESIRE TO
IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CUBA GOVERNED OUR ACTIONS
AT SAN JOSE. IF ANYTHING OUR MOTIVES ARE TO REDUCE

SOVIET INFLUENCE IN CUBA. IN SAN JOSE WE JOINED IN A FREEDOM OF ACTION FORMULA THAT HAD MAJORITY SUPPORT. THIS FORMULA WAS A LATIN AMERICAN INITIATIVE WHICH WE SUPPORTED IN ORDER TO REMOVE AN IRRITANT IN HEMISPHERIC RELATIONS AND PRESERVE INDEED REVIVE HEMISPHERIC SUPPORT FOR THE RIO TREATY. LAST WEEK WITHOUT ABANDONING OUR EMBARGO ON DIRECT TRADE WITH CUBA WE MODIFIED THOSE OF OUR OWN SANCTIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE CONFLICTED WITH THE DECISION TAKEN AT SAN JOSE. THE DETERMINING CRITERION OF OUR POLICY WAS THEREFORE ENTIRELY HEMISPHERIC WITHOUT CONCERN FOR EXTRANEEOUS CONSIDERATIONS LIKE DETENTE.

OPINIONS WILL OBVIOUSLY VARY ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE CUBAN SUBVERSIVE THREAT. MY OWN JUDGMENT IS THAT AN INCREASING NUMBER OF AMERICAN STATES NO LONGER SEE CUBA AS A SERIOUS THREAT. WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAS BEEN A REAL AND ENDURING CHANGE IN CUBAN INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITY FOR SUBVERSION, THERE IS MORE CONFIDENCE ON THE PART OF THE STATES THEMSELVES ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO DEAL WITH WHATEVER THREAT DOES EXIST. YOUR POINT ABOUT THE "EMERGENCE OF NEW PROTAGONISTS COMING FROM THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE" IS AGAIN RELEVANT HERE. FOR DESPITE THE MANIFOLD PROBLEMS WHICH CONFRONT US

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ALL, I DO SENSE IN MOST LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AN INCREASING SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN ADVANCEMENT AND SECURITY AND IN MANY CASES AN INCREASED SENSE OF CONFIDENCE IN THEIR OWN ABILITY TO EXERCISE THAT RESPONSIBILITY. THE STRENGTHENING AND RE-AFFIRMATION OF THE RIO TREATY AT SAN JOSE PROVIDES FURTHER REASSURANCE IN THIS REGARD. THE TREATY OF COURSE REMAINS OUR ULTIMATE SAFEGUARD AGAINST ANY RECRUDESCENCE OF THE CUBAN THREAT TO WHICH WE MUST CERTAINLY REMAIN ALERT. I ALSO SHARE YOUR DOUBT WHETHER CUBA IS DISPOSED TO COOPERATE IN THE HEMISPHERE AND TO UNDERTAKE FIRM COMMITMENTS TO ITS NEIGHBORS. WE WILL BE LOOKING FOR EVIDENCE OF CUBA'S READINESS TO UNDERTAKE ITS INTERNATIONAL AND HEMISPHERIC RESPONSIBILITIES. OUR POSTURE TOWARD CUBA AND TOWARD ITS ROLE IN THE HEMISPHERE WILL BE CONDITIONED BY OUR EVALUATION OF THEIR BEHAVIOR.

YOU HAVE RAISED THE QUESTION OF OUR OWN RELATIONS WITH CUBA. AS I HAVE INDICATED OUR LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THIRD COUNTRIES HAS NOT EASED OUR EMBARGO ON DIRECT TRADE WITH CUBA. SHOULD CUBA ADOPT A MORE COOPERATIVE APPROACH IN THE FUTURE WE MAY EVENTUALLY CONSIDER CHANGES IN OUR POSTURE, BUT

SUCH CHANGES WILL BE BASED ON A RECIPROCAL PROCESS
IN WHICH CUBA WILL HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS READINESS
TO FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS TO US. SHOULD SUCH AN
EVOLUTION BEGIN YOU WILL BE AMONG THE FIRST TO KNOW,
DIRECTLY FROM ME.

FINALLY, ANTONIO, I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE
QUESTION OF THE BROADER HEMISPHERIC DIALOGUE WHICH
YOU RAISE IN YOUR LETTER. I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT
THE CURRENT CLIMATE IS NOT CONDUCTIVE TO A
RESUSCITATION OF THE NEW DIALOGUE IN A FORMAL SENSE.
BUT I REMAIN AS INTERESTED AS I ALWAYS HAVE BEEN
IN THE PROBLEM OF IMPROVED COMMUNICATION WITHIN
THE HEMISPHERE. AND I HAVE BEEN GREATLY HEARTENED BY
THE HIGH QUALITY OF DIALOGUE THAT WE WITNESSED AT THE
RECENT OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND AT THE SAN JOSE
MEETING ON THE RIO TREATY. YET IT SEEMS TO ME THAT
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ON THE ISSUES THAT TRANSCEND HEMISPHERIC CONCERNS,
THE LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS THEMSELVES NEED TO COME
TO SOME AGREEMENT ON HOW A REGIONAL DIALOGUE CAN
BE FOLDED INTO THE GLOBAL DEBATE.

ON THIS ISSUE, AS ON OTHERS, I AS ALWAYS WELCOME
YOUR VIEWS. I BELIEVE THAT CLOSE CONSULTATION
BETWEEN US AND OUR GOVERNMENTS WILL BE AN INDISPENSABLE
REQUISITE TO ANY PROGRESS WE MAKE ON THE PROBLEMS
WHICH CONFRONT BOTH OF OUR NATIONS. WARMEST
REGARDS, HENRY. END TEXT.
KISSINGER

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